In the open power market, there is a surplus of producers (generators) or consumers (large consumers), which will directly affect the pricing strategy of large consumers direct-power-purchasing. Under the background, with the Rubinstein model, this paper constructs the bargain models of pricing of large consumers direct-power-purchasing in single generator-various consumers and various generators-single consumer transaction under the circumstance of incomplete information and asymmetric pressure, and then gives the equilibrium profit of generators and large consumers. The result indicates that the profit of both parties is related to the discount rate and the estimation of the reserve price. Generators and large consumers can calculate and evaluate the profit of the agreement with different objects with the conclusion of the paper, and choose the cooperative object reasonably. The model and conclusion are also suitable to the bargaining game under the circumstance of the producer (generator) surplus or the consumer (large consumer) surplus in the market.
徐云,应黎明.非对称压力下大用户直购电价格的讨价还价博弈[J].电力科学与技术学报,2021,(2):142-147. Xu Yun, Ying Liming. The bargain model for pricing of direct-power-purchasing under asymmetric pressure[J]. JOURNAL OF EIECTRIC POWER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2021,(2):142-147.复制