从分区定价方法看电价机制中的“反直觉”问题:研究方法及其代理模拟分析
CSTR:
作者:
作者单位:

(1.中国电力科学研究院有限公司,北京 100000;2.华南理工大学电力学院,广东 广州 510000;3.山东电力交易中心有限公司,山东 济南 370100)

通讯作者:

荆朝霞(1975—),女,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事电力市场、电动汽车、综合能源系统优化、电力系统运行与控制

中图分类号:

TM863

基金项目:

国家电网公司重点科技项目(SGSDJY00JSJS2100008)


"Counter‑intuitive" issues in electricity pricing mechanism from the perspective of zonal pricing methods: research methodology and agent‑based simulation analysis
Author:
Affiliation:

(1.China Electric Power Research Institute Co.,Ltd., Beijing 100000, China; 2.School of Electrical Engineering, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510000, China; 3.Shandong Power Exchange Center Co.,Ltd., Jinan 370100, China)

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    摘要:

    考虑电力市场的动态性、系统性和长期性等因素,市场中会有很多“反直觉”的问题,即正确推论与人们的直觉相反。为此,以分区定价机制为例,对电价机制中的反直觉问题进行探讨。首先,以机制设计理论为基础,分析机制设计中的激励相容问题及与反直觉现象的关系;然后,针对市场主体的动态特征,对反直觉问题提出静态分析与动态分析相结合的分析方法;最后,以发电侧节点加权平均价格作为结算价格为例,从上述2个层面对该机制下可能产生的反直觉问题进行仿真分析。结果表明:该机制下由于部分市场主体申报考虑个体理性的价格,反而不会降低购电成本。需要对该类机组设计相应的成本补偿和分摊机制以满足市场的激励相容约束。

    Abstract:

    Considering factors such as the dynamic, systematic, and long?term nature of the electricity market, there are often many counter?intuitive issues, the correct inferences contradict people's intuitions. In this regard, taking the zonal pricing mechanism as an example, counterintuitive issues within the electricity pricing mechanism are explored. Firstly, based on mechanism design theory, Firstly, based on mechanism design theory, the incentive compatibility issues in mechanism design and their relationship with counter?intuitive phenomena are analyzed. In response to the dynamic characteristics of market participants, an analytical approach that combines static and dynamic analyses is presented for addressing counterintuitive issues. Finally, using the generation?side nodal weighted average price as the settlement price as the example, a simulation analysis on potential counter?intuitive issues arising from the mentioned mechanism is carried out from both the static and dynamic perspectives. The results indicate that under this mechanism, due to some market participants declaring prices based on individual rationality, it does not necessarily lead to a reduction in electricity procurement costs. To address this, there is a need to design corresponding cost compensation and sharing mechanisms for such units, ensuring compliance with incentive compatibility constraints in the market.

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龙苏岩,宋瑜辉,刘宇明,等.从分区定价方法看电价机制中的“反直觉”问题:研究方法及其代理模拟分析[J].电力科学与技术学报,2023,38(6):20-33.
LONG Suyan, SONG Yuhui, LIU Yuming, et al."Counter‑intuitive" issues in electricity pricing mechanism from the perspective of zonal pricing methods: research methodology and agent‑based simulation analysis[J]. Journal of Electric Power Science and Technology,2023,38(6):20-33.

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